Constitution

Governor’s Timeline to Assent Bills and the Recent Presidential Reference

Harshvardhan Melanta

September 24, 2025

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The relationship between India’s constitutional functionaries, particularly Governors and the President, with elected state legislatures has recently emerged as one of the most significant constitutional issues facing the country. This analysis centers on two pivotal developments: the landmark Supreme Court judgment in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) and the subsequent Presidential Reference under Article 143, with respect to powers and timelines for assenting to state bills by the Governors.

The Supreme Court has reserved its opinion on the said reference.

Historical Context and Constitutional Framework

The constitutional framework governing powers of Governor over state legislation is mentioned in Article 200 of the Constitution of India and finds its origins in the Government of India Act 1935¹. Under Article 200, when a bill is passed by a state legislature and presented to the Governor, three options are available: granting assent, withholding assent, or reserving the bill for Presidential consideration.²

The Constituent Assembly debates reveal a deliberate dilution of Governor’s discretionary powers. The deletion of the phrase “in his discretion” from the draft Article 200 demonstrates the framers’ intent to limit independent his authority. As noted in the Assembly debates, the expectation was that the Governor would act as “a constitutional head, a sagacious counsellor and adviser to the ministry someone who can pour oil over troubled waters”.³

However, the practical implementation of these provisions has often deviated from constitutional intent, leading to significant tensions between state governments and Governors, particularly in opposition-ruled states.

The State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu Case (2025)

Between January 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed twelve bills primarily related to university governance and administration. These bills aimed to transfer certain powers from the Governor (acting as ex-officio Chancellor) to the state government with respect to inspections of universities and Vice-Chancellor appointments.⁴

Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi’s handling of these bills created an unprecedented constitutional crisis. Despite the bills being duly passed by the elected legislature, the Governor maintained complete silence for extended periods. On 13th November, 2023, after the Supreme Court issued notice on the state’s writ petition, the Governor suddenly acted on all pending bills, withholding (refusing) assent to ten bills and reserving two for Presidential consideration.⁵

The crisis deepened when the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, in a special session on 18^th November, 2023, reconsidered and re-passed the ten bills that had been denied assent. However, instead of granting assent as constitutionally mandated under the first proviso to Article 200, the Governor reserved these bills for Presidential consideration.⁶

On 8^th April, 2025, the judgment, delivered by Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, held that the Governor’s actions were “illegal and erroneous in law,” establishing several crucial constitutional principles⁷:

First, the Court definitively ruled that there is no concept of “absolute veto” or “pocket veto” under Article 200. The Constitution does not permit Governors to indefinitely delay action on bills passed by state legislatures.⁸

Second, the judgment clarified that once a Governor withholds assent and returns a bill to the legislature for reconsideration, and the legislature re-passes the bill (with or without amendments), the Governor cannot subsequently reserve it for Presidential consideration. The three options under Article 200 are mutually exclusive.ly violated their duties⁹.

Third, the Court established that Governors must act within constitutionally reasonable timeframes and prescribed specific timelines for different scenarios:

• One month for decisions taken with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
• Three months for decisions taken contrary to ministerial advice
• One month for bills re-presented after legislative reconsideration

In an unprecedented exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court deemed the ten Tamil Nadu bills to have received Governor’s assent on 18^th November, 2023—the date they were re-presented after legislative reconsideration¹⁰. This may have marked the first time in Indian constitutional history that bills became law without formal Governor’s or Presidential signature.

The Court justified this extraordinary remedy by citing the Governor’s “lack of bona fides” and the need to ensure “complete justice” in circumstances where constitutional authorities had clearly violated their duties.¹¹

The Presidential Reference Under Article 143

The Supreme Court’s Tamil Nadu judgment prompted the President of India to invoke the rarely-used advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution. Under Article 143, the President of India can seek advise from the Supreme Court by making reference to it. The advice given by the Supreme Court are not binding except in certain situations.

On 13^th May, 2025, the President referred fourteen questions to the Supreme Court seeking clarification on various aspects of Governor’s and Presidential powers over state bills.¹²

Constitutional Commissions and Historical Precedents

The current constitutional crisis did not emerge in a vacuum. Multiple constitutional commissions have examined the relationship between Governors and state legislatures, offering recommendations that remain largely unimplemented.

Sarkaria Commission (1988)

The Sarkaria Commission extensively examined Centre-State relations and made several key recommendations regarding Governor’s powers¹⁷;

• Governors should act on bills within one month of presentation¹⁸
• Reservation of bills for Presidential consideration should be used sparingly and only in cases of clear unconstitutionality¹⁹
• The President should dispose of reserved bills within 4 months²⁰
• Governors should ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers²¹

Punchhi Commission (2010)²²

The Punchhi Commission built upon the Sarkaria Commission’s work and recommended more specific timelines²³:

• Governors should decide on bills within six months of presentation²⁴
• Constitutional amendments should be considered to incorporate these timelines²⁵
• The President should act on reserved bills within a maximum of 6 months²⁶

These commission recommendations, while not binding, reflect sustained expert concern about delays in exercising its powers by the Governors and its impact on federal governance.

Judicial Precedents

Several landmark Supreme Court cases have shaped the constitutional understanding of gubernatorial powers:

Union of India vs. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979)²⁷: This five-judge Constitution Bench judgment held that Governors are “constitutional heads of the State Executive” and must generally act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The decision established that bills “fall through” when assent is withheld unless the procedure under the first proviso to Article 200 is followed.

Rameshwar Prasad vs. Union of India (2006)²⁸: This judgment clarified that the immunity under Article 361 (under which President or Governor shall not be answerable to any court for any acts done in duty) does not prevent judicial review of actions of the Governor, establishing that constitutional functionaries remain subject to judicial scrutiny.

State of Punjab vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor (2023)²⁹: This decision reinforced that Governors must follow the first proviso to Article 200 when withholding assent, requiring bills to be returned to the legislature for reconsideration.

The Presidential Reference Hearings: Key Developments

Chief Justice Gavai raised a fundamental question during the hearings: “If one wing of democracy fails in discharging its duties, would the court, which is the custodian of the Constitution, be powerless and forced to sit idle?”³⁰. This query encapsulates the central tension between judicial restraint and constitutional enforcement.

The Centre has argued that issuing mandamus to constitutional authorities would violate the separation of powers which is a part of “basic structure”³¹ of the Constitution³².

Senior Advocate K.K. Venugopal, representing Kerala, argued that “Governors must deal with Bills as soon as possible and not as soon as convenient,” emphasizing that constitutional functionaries cannot act at their own leisure. This position reflects the broader argument that indefinite delays amount to an effective veto over democratic legislation³³.

Conversely, the Centre has maintained that Governors serve as constitutional checks against potentially unconstitutional legislation, with Attorney General Venkataramani arguing that Governors possess the power to examine bills for constitutional compliance before they become law³⁴.

Timeline Implementation and Practical Challenges

The hearings have revealed significant concerns about the practical implementation of judicially-imposed timelines. Justice Narasimha observed that “when courts start fixing timelines, it places the judiciary in a tight situation” and noted that timeline-related cases often generate further litigation³⁵.

The Centre has argued that timeline implementation could create a flood of mandamus petitions, with states approaching courts whenever Governors exceed prescribed periods. This could potentially transform courts into “judicial headmasters” overseeing executive functions.³⁶

Constitutional Implications

The Presidential Reference proceedings and the underlying Tamil Nadu judgment have profound implications for Indian constitutional law and federal governance:

Redefining Federal Relations

The Supreme Court’s intervention in Governor’s powers represents a significant shift toward judicial enforcement of federal cooperation. By establishing that Governors cannot indefinitely delay bills, the Court has strengthened state autonomy within the federal structure.

Precedential Value of Advisory Opinions

A crucial question emerging from the Reference concerns the binding nature of advisory opinions under Article 143. While traditionally considered non-binding, extensive reliance on previous advisory opinions suggests evolving jurisprudential practice.³⁷

Article 142 and Complete Justice

The use of Article 142 to deem assent represents an innovative constitutional remedy. This precedent could influence future cases involving constitutional deadlocks, though it raises questions about the appropriate scope of judicial intervention in executive functions.³⁸

Challenges and Criticisms

The current constitutional approach faces several significant challenges:

Political Considerations

Critics argue that the emphasis on timelines and judicial oversight politicizes constitutional offices and reduces Governors to mere “rubber stamps” for state governments. The concern is that legitimate constitutional scrutiny could be compromised in the rush to meet judicial deadlines.

Practical Implementation

The enforcement of judicial timelines requires ongoing court supervision, potentially drawing the judiciary into administrative functions that may be better handled through political processes. The risk is that courts become “monitoring authorities” rather than dispute-resolution forums.

Federal Balance

While the current approach strengthens state autonomy, it may weaken the Centre’s ability to ensure constitutional compliance across states. This could affect national unity and legal coherence in situations where states pass potentially problematic legislation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s Tamil Nadu judgment has established clear boundaries on Governor discretion while the ongoing Presidential Reference proceedings will likely provide definitive constitutional guidance on these issues.

The Court’s stress on need for timely action by constitutional authorities, reflects that constitutional rules are not misused in any manner while governing. However, the challenge lies in maintaining appropriate constitutional balance, ensuring that Governors can fulfill their legitimate constitutional roles while preventing the paralysis of democratic institutions through indefinite delays.

The outcome of the Presidential Reference will likely establish precedents for Centre-State relations and the role of constitutional functionaries in India’s federal system. The Court faces the delicate task of providing clarity while maintaining the flexibility necessary for constitutional governance in a diverse democracy.

As Dr. B.R. Ambedkar observed, and as also quoted in the Tamil Nadu judgment: “However good a constitution may be, if those who are implementing it are not good, it will prove to be bad”³⁹. The present constitutional crisis highlights the need for functionaries to act with constitutional morality rather than political bias, so that India’s federal democracy can truly serve the aspirations of its diverse people. The hope is that this moment will strengthen federal democracy while preserving the vital checks and balances that safeguard constitutional governance.

1. Section 75 of Government of India Act, 1935 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1935/2/pdfs/ukpga_19350002_en.pdf ↩︎
2. Article 200 of Constitution of India
   https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf ↩︎
3. Supra 1 ↩︎
4. ‘What Are the 10 Bills of Tamil Nadu Withheld by Governor Now Considered Assented to After Supreme Court Verdict’.” The Hindu, April 9, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/what-are-the-10-bills-of-tamil-nadu-withheld-by-governor-now-considered-assented-to-after-supreme-court-verdict/article69426419.ece ↩︎
5. Supra 1 ↩︎
6. Supra 1 ↩︎
7. Supra 1 ↩︎
8. Supra 1 ↩︎
9. Supra 1 ↩︎
10. Supra 1, Para 435 (c) ↩︎
11. Supra 1 ↩︎
12. Presidential Reference on Deadlines for Governors: LIVE UPDATES from Supreme Court — Day 10,” Bar & Bench, Sept. 11, 2025, https://www.barandbench.com/news/presidential-reference-on-deadlines-for-governors-live-updates-from-supreme-court-day-10 ↩︎
13. Presidential Reference on Deadlines for Governors: LIVE UPDATES from Supreme Court — Day 10,” Bar & Bench, Sept. 11, 2025, https://www.barandbench.com/news/presidential-reference-on-deadlines-for-governors-live-updates-from-supreme-court-day-10 ↩︎
14. Supreme Court Presidential Reference Hearing: Live Updates — September 9, 2025,” The Hindu, Sept. 9, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-presidential-reference-hearing-live-updates-september-9-2025/article70028475.ece ↩︎
15. Presidential Reference Hearing, Supreme Court LIVE Updates — September 11, 2025,” The Hindu, Sept. 11, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/presidential-reference-hearing-supreme-court-live-updates-september-11-2025/article70036346.ece ↩︎
16. Governor and President’s Powers — Day 3: Timelines for Giving Assent to Bills Will Lead to “Constitutional Disorder,” Union Warns, Supreme Court Observer, Sept. 11, 2025, https://www.scobserver.in/reports/governor-and-presidents-powers-day-3-timelines-for-giving-assent-to-bills-will-lead-to-constitutional-disorder-union-warns/ ↩︎
17. Report of the Sarkaria Commission, Interstate Council, https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/report-of-the-sarkaria-commission/ ↩︎
18. Ibid, Pg. 23, Chap. V, Section 19 – Recommendations, 5.19.04 ↩︎
19. Ibid, Pg. 23, Chap. V, Section 19 – Recommendations, 5.19.03 ↩︎
20. Ibid, Pg. 18, Chap. V, Section 16 – Time-Limits, 5.16.03 ↩︎
21. Ibid, Pg. 12, Chap. V, Section 6 – Scope of Governor’s Discretion under Article 200, 5.6.13 ↩︎
22. Formally known as “Commission on Centre-State Relations” https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/report-of-the-commission-on-centre-state-relations/ ↩︎
23. Ibid ↩︎
24. Ibid, Vol II, Chap. 4, 4.5.01, Pg. 71 ↩︎
25. Ibid, Vol II, Chap. 4, 4.5.01, Pg. 70 ↩︎
26. Ibid, Vol II, Chap. 4, 3.6.03, Pg. 26 ↩︎
27. 1979 AIR 1415 ↩︎
28. (2006) 2 SCC 1 ↩︎
29. WP(C)/1224/2023 ↩︎
30. Court Will Not Sit Idle If a Wing of Democracy Fails to Discharge Its Duties: Supreme Court,” The Hindu, Sept. 11, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/court-will-not-sit-idle-if-a-wing-of-democracy-fails-to-discharge-its-duties-supreme-court/article70038037.ece ↩︎
31. unwritten set of core principles in the Constitution as established in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) ↩︎
32. Express News Service, Presidential reference: SC reserves decision, asks ‘if one wing of democracy fails…would court have to sit idle?’, Indian Express, Sept. 12, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/presidential-reference-sc-reserves-decision-fixing-timeline-guvs-nod-bills-10243527/ ↩︎
33. Gursimran Kaur Bakshi, Presidential Reference: Karnataka, Kerala & Punjab Argue in Supreme Court Against Giving Governors Power to Withhold Bills Indefinitely, LiveLaw, Sept. 9, 2025, https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/presidential-reference-karnataka-kerala-punjab-argue-in-supreme-court-against-giving-governors-power-to-withhold-bills-indefinitely-303356 ↩︎
34. Supra 14 ↩︎
35. Supra 15 ↩︎
36. Governor and President’s Powers | Day 11: Court Cannot Play Headmaster, Says Union; Suggests States Engage in a Dialogue with Governors, Supreme Court Observer, Sept. 10, 2025, https://www.scobserver.in/reports/governor-and-presidents-powers-day-11-court-cannot-play-headmaster-says-union-suggests-states-engage-in-a-dialogue-with-governors/ ↩︎
37. D. Chatterjee, “Presidential References and Their Precedential Value,” National Law School of India Review (NLSIR) 2009, repository.nls.ac.in, https://repository.nls.ac.in/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=nlsir ↩︎
38. G. Arshiya, Has the Supreme Court Been “Trigger Happy” With Article 142?, SCO Observer, https://www.scobserver.in/journal/has-the-supreme-court-been-trigger-happy-with-article-142/ ↩︎
39. Supra 1, Para 439 ↩︎